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1. Introduction 
Over the past three decades, Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries have aimed to reduce 
public ownership of electricity utilities through sectoral reforms. The reforms were partly due 
to critical budgetary conditions and part of macroeconomic stabilisation programs. Although 
no country in the region have implemented all steps of comprehensive reforms,
1
 the reforms 
have largely ended the era of self-regulation of the sector by the state. In its place, 
Independent Regulatory Agencies (IRAs) were created to regulate; set standards; define 
terms of interconnection among networks; issue, enforce or alter licences; and prevent abuse 
of dominant market position.
2
 
These objectives suggest IRAs were primarily established to promote economic regulation. 
However, as Thatcher (2002) noted, independent regulators (as in other sectors) were also 
delegated powers over ‘social’ matters such as the promotion of universal access to services 
and protection of consumers from exploitations. In order to fulfil these mandates, IRAs were 
expected to reduce the risk to the private sector to increase generation capacity and extend the 
reach of electricity services (Jamasb et al., 2015) to the millions without access in the region 
(IEA, 2014). Despite the expected performance improvements from regulatory changes, SSA 
countries have struggled to provide efficient and affordable electricity services to businesses 
and households (Eberhard et al., 2011) due to low generation capacity and underdeveloped 
distribution and transmission networks (World Bank, 2017; Ahlborg et al., 2015). 
Some studies have linked the poor reform outcomes in developing countries to historical, 
financial, social, technical, political as well as economic factors (e.g., Dorman, 2014; 
Eberhard et al., 2011). Some researchers have shifted their attention to the institutional and 
political context within which IRAs are embedded and perform their regulatory functions 
(e.g., Imam et al., 2019; Pearce, 2006; Nepal and Jamasb, 2012a; Chang and Berdiev, 2011; 
Eberhard, 2007). These studies suggest that IRAs are susceptible to interferences particularly 
in countries with long history of weak institutions and unpredictable political intervention. 
For example, in countries with weak institutions, governments may intervene in the functions 
of IRAs to favour state utilities at the expense of private utilities or require the IRAs to set 
artificially low tariffs which would erode the investments by private utilities (World Bank, 
1993). 
As the reforms in the region have not led to full withdrawal of the state from the sector but 
rather to the emergence of hybrid electricity sectors with dominant state-owned utilities 
(Eberhard et al., 2016), there has been a lack of compatibility in these sectors between the 
governments political ideologies and the reforms which were often viewed as a neoliberal 
agenda (Gore et al., 2018). Therefore, in some SSA countries regulators have struggled to 
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 With the exception of Nigeria, which have implemented all features of the reform model. 
2
 These agencies were created as part of electricity sector reforms which were heavily advocated to developing 
countries by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. 
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cater for the economic incentives of private utilities and social objectives of governments 
such as increasing access to affordable electricity services. 
Despite the anecdotes that relate government ideology to regulatory outcomes in the region, 
there is a lack of empirical evidence that links political interference in the IRAs functions to 
electricity sector performance. Some studies have shown how energy regulators function 
under different institutional settings such as different government ideologies (e.g., Pitlik, 
2007; Potrafke, 2010; Hibbs, 1977; Alesina, 1987). These studies suggest that right-wing 
governments tend to favour deregulation and privatisation, while left-wing governments 
favour interference in regulatory functions to advance their social objectives. Some studies 
have focused on the effect of government ideology on regulatory output (e.g., Fudge et al., 
2008; Conway and Nicoletti, 2006; Serralles, 2002; Damsgaard, 2003). However, most of 
these studies are either theoretical or on the experiences of developed countries where data 
are readily available. 
To our knowledge, the present paper is among the few studies to empirically assess the 
impacts of electricity sector reforms in SSA countries (e.g., Imam et al., 2019) and is the first 
to empirically examine the effects of interactions between government ideologies of SSA 
countries and independent electricity sector regulators. Most studies of this strand of 
literature on developing countries tend to focus on specific aspects of institutional quality 
such as corruption (e.g., Imam et al., 2019; Estache et al., 2009; Wren-Lewis, 2015) or on 
specific countries without explicitly accounting for the role of political ideology apart from 
those earlier mentioned. 
We use a dataset on government ideology first compiled by Beck et al. (2001) and later 
updated by Cruz et al. (2018) to investigate whether there are ideological differences in the 
effects of IRAs on electricity sector performance among SSA countries. Following Potrafke 
(2010), we divide our sample into three different government ideologies – left-wing, right-
wing, and centrist – in order to reflect the ideological orientation and different economic and 
social objectives of SSA countries. Whether a government transfers functions such as 
provision of electricity service to the private sector and make non-interference commitments 
depends not only on the degree of independence of the regulator, but also on the prevailing 
ideological orientation of the governments. 
This paper makes two contributions to the literature. First, we contribute to the analysis of the 
institutional aspect of the reforms (e.g., Imam et al., 2019; Nepal and Jamasb, 2012a, 2012b; 
Dorman, 2014; Erdogdu, 2013) and the political economy literature on regulatory agencies 
(e.g., Kapiki and Eberhard, 2013; Pitlik, 2007; Potrafke, 2010; Scott and Seth, 2013). Second, 
our analysis of political ideology and electricity reforms provide insights into why some SSA 
countries choose to reform while others do not. Why is it difficult to implement the Chilean 
and the United Kingdom examples of rapid and full implementation of the textbook reform 
model? Why start reforms with the generation rather than the distribution segment? And, 
whether there are differences among reforming countries in terms of political commitments to 
allow regulatory agencies to function unhindered. 
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The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. We review the literature on energy 
reforms and ideology in Section 2. Section 3 presents our model, which tries to capture how 
government ideologies and independent regulators influence SSA countries’ electricity sector 
performance. The section further presents our estimation strategy and the data used. Section 4 
discusses the obtained results. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature review 
The role of energy in economic development has been well established in the literature even 
though there is no clear consensus on the direction of causality between them (Masih and 
Masih, 1997; Lorde et al., 2010; Burk et al., 2018).
3
 Notwithstanding, electricity is essential 
for the smooth operation of modern communications, industrial development, and 
enhancement of social amenities such as healthcare and education (e.g., Ahlborg et al., 2015). 
Due to its welfare enhancing effects electricity generation, transmission, distribution, and 
retailing have historically been the prerogative of the state and public sector and therefore 
closed to private investment (Conway and Nicoletti, 2006). 
The historical dominance of the state was mainly due to the view that provision of electricity 
is among the central functions of governments especially in countries where the state 
occupies a large space in the economy (Victor and Heller, 2011). As a result, the electricity 
sector in most countries was dominated by vertically integrated state-owned utilities 
(Eberhard et al., 2005). Even in countries with significant number of private utilities such as 
the United States (Min, 2008), the government funded the development and construction of 
national electricity infrastructure such as the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Hoover 
Dam in 1920s and 1930s (Garwood and Tuthill, 1963; Hirsch, 1999). The Soviet Union at its 
founding in 1920s, created the State Commission for Electrification of Russia (GOELRO) to 
extend electricity services to the entire country (Min, 2008). Similarly, the governments of 
Germany, Netherlands, and Scandinavia made political commitments to connect 90% of 
households by 1930 (Nye, 1992). In effect no country successfully extended electricity to all 
its parts without the support of the state (Barnes and Floor, 1996). 
However, beginning in the 1980s and in response to a combination of political, ideological, 
economic and technological factors the sector has undergone extensive restructurings to 
facilitate market solutions and private sector investments and participation (Jamasb et al., 
2015). These restructurings, which were also referred to as the “Standard Textbook Reform 
Model”, were part of a broader set of economic policy objectives that formed part of the 
‘Washington Consensus’. The reform model which were first implemented in Chile and the 
United Kingdom, showed that effective implementation would enhance technical efficiency 
by reducing generation costs and price-cost gaps, and increase investment (Jamasb et al., 
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 A literature review by Narayan and Prasad (2008) showed that two-thirds of the studies published in the 
journals Energy Policy and Energy Economics find that energy production and consumption lead to economic 
growth in developed and developing countries. 
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2015). Moreover, the efficiency gains were expected to be translated into affordable access to 
improved services. 
The electricity reforms aim to reduce the dominance of state-owned utilities in the sector 
(Dornan, 2014). Following the experiences of the pioneers and other OECD countries, 
developing countries were encouraged by the IMF and the World Bank to unbundle the key 
functions of the electricity sector. These countries would then privatise the unbundled parts 
amenable to competition or regulation to the private sector and create independent regulatory 
agencies to supervise and regulate the monopoly-prone parts of the sector (Victor and Heller, 
2007). Therefore, the main features of the Electricity Sector Reform (ESR) in developing 
countries were the introduction of market competition and private sector participation into the 
electricity markets. 
In the 1990s, SSA countries began to implement ESR, even though no country in the region 
succeeded in implementing the entire suite of the reform model with the exception of Nigeria. 
This is because some aspects of the ESR model were viewed by politicians to pose 
differential risks; thus the reform parts considered as low-threats (e.g., entry of Independent 
Power Producers, IPPs) were mostly encouraged (Karekezi et al., 2004). Also, resistance to 
tariff increases by citizens who associate the reforms with neoliberal agenda, labour unions 
with socialist traditions, and Africans educated with Afro-socialist leaning views, galvanise 
to pressurise politicians to resist reforms even if the governments’ view on ESR were positive 
(Batley, 2004; van de Walle, 1989; Gore et al., 2018). 
Notwithstanding the politics surrounding the implementation of reforms in the region, as of 
2014, 24 countries had enacted ESR laws, three-quarters had attracted private sector 
participation, two-thirds had corporatised their electricity utilities, a similar number had set-
up regulatory bodies, and more than a third had IPPs in place (Eberhard et al., 2008). As a 
result, the dominance of governments in the sector has declined as they maintain their 
presence by creating IRAs to oversee and regulate the sector. The design and creations of 
IRAs which were influenced by the literature on central bank independence, credible 
commitments of governments and political uncertainties (e.g., Rogoff, 1985; Thatcher, 2002), 
were motivated by the desire to insulate policies from future political interference, signal the 
credibility and commitments of reforming governments’ to end self-regulation as well as 
replace political considerations by economic concerns (Estache et al., 2009; Pearce, 2006; 
Jamasb et al., 2004). 
Therefore, IRAs are expected to protect private investors from the whims of the state, and 
consumers seeking protection from the incentives of dominant firm to influence prices 
through exerting market power or by tacit collusion with others (Jamasb et al., 2015). The 
creation of IRAs does not entail complete abandonment of the role of government in the 
sector. Rather, it shifts this role towards regulation and away from service provision, 
subsidising or financing of the sector. Therefore, the main outcome of the refrom is a switch 
from self-regulation or politically regulated provision of electricity to private sector provision 
of service and regulation by IRAs without political interference and conflict of interests 
(Estache et al., 2009). 
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The creation of the IRAs has been a major aspect of the reforms in SSA countries. During the 
period covered by this study, more than 50% of the countries in the region have established 
IRAs. These countries were also major beneficiaries of private sector investments (Eberhard 
et al., 2016).  
Table 1 shows the creation dates of the regulators in SSA. Performance of the regulators in 
the region has been mixed. For example, effective regulation has been credited with 
significant improvements in financial and operating performance of the privatised utilities 
(Eberhard et al., 2016). However, these contrast sharply with studies that argue that SSA 
countries continue to suffer socially and economically post the reforms, due to insufficient 
investment levels required to improve generation capacity and reliability of service, increase 
access rates, and reduce transmission and distribution losses (Aurial and Blanc, 2009; 
Eberhard et al., 2011; Ahlborg et al., 2015). 
 
Table 1: SSA Countries with IRAs 
SSA IRAs and Year of Establishment 
Year Countries 
1994 South Africa 
1997 Zambia 
1998 Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Senegal 
1999 Niger, Madagascar, Uganda 
2000 Ghana, Mali, Namibia, Togo 
2001 The Gambia, Mauritania, Rwanda, Tanzania 
2003 Cape Verde, Congo Republic, Zimbabwe 
2004 Lesotho, Mozambique 
2005 Central African Republic, Nigeria, São Tomé and Príncipe  
2006 Kenya 
2007 Angola, Malawi, Swaziland 
2009 Benin 
2010 Burkina Faso, Gabon 
2011 Burundi, Sierra Leone, Sudan 
2012 Seychelles 
2014 Ethiopia 
Source: Eberhard et al. (2016) and updated with data from Foster et al. (2017), 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/28853/WPS8235.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y; 
and Cape Verde, Seychelles, and São Tomé and Príncipe regulatory agencies’ websites: Agência de Regulação 
Económica, http://www.are.cv/index.php; Seychelles Energy Commission, http://www.sec.sc/; and Autoridade 
Geral de Regulação, http://www.ager-stp.org/index.php/pt/. 
7 
 
Although, these poor reform outcomes have been attributed to a number of factors,
4
 some 
have linked them to the broader national and institutional context within which IRAs are 
embedded (e.g., Minogue and Carino, 2006; Berg, 2000). This is because the quality of 
political institutions, credibility and reliability of the judiciary, institutional norms, 
administrative capacity and related factors were noted to have the potential to shape the 
functions of IRAs (Dubash and Rao, 2007). For example, in the SSA context, Eberhard (2007) 
argues that the failures of IRAs to achieve their mandates may be linked to unpredictable and 
inconsistent regulatory policies which are usually the fallouts of unstable and changing policy 
environments in which they operate. 
Similarly, Chang and Berdiev (2011), Pitlik (2008), Vowles (2008) and Bodea (2010) have 
noted that the degree of government fragmentation, institutional constraints, political strength 
and government authority can induce governments to reverse or change previous enacted 
policies such as commitment not to interfere in regulatory functions. For example, in Uganda, 
the electricity regulatory authority was routinely harassed by the government, summoned and 
questioned before the Parliament (although not accountable to the Parliament) for increasing 
electricity tariffs and investigated by the police (Kapika and Eberhard, 2013). 
This shows that even though the regulators in the SSA are independent and have desire to 
improve efficiency and access rates, their regulatory powers can be undermined by the 
institutional environment in which they operate. Thus, institutions which consist of formal 
and informal rules and norms (North, 1990) may determine the incentives of governments not 
to interfere with regulatory functions. However, the main institutional factor identified by 
most studies, were political interferences in regulatory functions. Implementation of reforms 
in SSA was heavily influenced by domestic political dynamics and citizens expectations of 
state provision of electricity (Gore et al., 2018). Also, governments tend to fill positions in 
the regulatory agencies with political and financial allies to keep electricity prices low and to 
incentivise poor voters (Estache and Wren-Lewis, 2010). Karekezi and Kimani (2002) find 
examples of this in Kenya, Malawi, and Uganda. 
Therefore, in order to understand the performance of the regulators in the region, the focus 
should not only be on technical aspects of regulation such as tariff setting methodologies and 
their implementations, but also on contextual factors such as the political environment in 
which IRAs operate. This has led many studies to examine how political institutions 
influence the functions of IRAs in the sector (Imam et al., 2019; Chang and Berdiev, 2001; 
Cubbin and Stern, 2006; Erdogdu, 2013; Nepal and Jamasb, 2012b). These studies find 
evidence that political factors impact regulatory decisions which in turn affect regulatory 
outcomes. Although, there are several reasons (e.g., redistribution and economic development) 
why politicians intrude into IRAs’ functions, however, the most widely cited is the need to 
correct market failure and enhance citizens’ welfare (Munger, 2008). 
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 See World Bank (2017), Ahlborg et al. (2015), Eberhard et al. (2011), Sokona et al. (2012), and Khennas 
(2012) for details on these factors. 
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However, studies such as Pitlik (2007) suggest that although government interference may 
have detrimental effects, some regulation and public intervention is needed for a well-
functioning economic system. Notwithstanding these conflicting arguments, a vast literature 
has emerged to show how governments based on ideological orientations of their political 
parties interfere in regulatory functions and influence outcomes (e.g., Benoit and Laver, 2006; 
Bjørnskov and Potrafke, 2011; Duso, 2002). Similarly, other studies specific to the energy 
sector have shown how energy regulators function under different institutional settings such 
as under different government ideologies (e.g., Pitlik, 2007; Potrafke, 2010; Hibbs, 1977; 
Alesina, 1987). For example, analysis of political economy of energy reforms in developing 
countries have noted that consumer opposition to energy price increases often forces 
governments to reverse their earlier policy commitments. Apart from consumer resistance to 
price increases, political opposition to reforms in developing countries was often backed by 
ideological arguments (Dorman, 2014). This is because political parties tend to promote 
economic policies in conformity with the ideology of their government (Hibbs, 1977; Chang 
and Berviev, 2011). Moreover, giving in to pressures from international multilateral 
organisations to transfer policy making powers to IRAs could depend on politicians who are 
more or less inclined towards the ideological orientations of their political parties. Therefore, 
government ideology may affect the functions of IRAs in SSA because it could determine 
government perceptions about these functions. 
In this regard, the right-wing ideologies are mostly associated with policies aimed at 
protecting private property, deregulation, and privatisation which are all aimed at expanding 
the free market ideology. This has been supported by studies such as Pitlik (2007), Potrafke 
(2009) and Duso (2002), which show that liberalisation, deregulation, and privatisation 
policies are pursued by right-wing governments. In other words, right-wing governments 
promote economic freedom and prefer minimum government involvement in the economy, 
while left-wing governments are more likely to pursue social regulation to protect citizens 
from exploitation (Chang and Berdiev, 2011). Serrallés (2006) argues that the promotion of 
neoliberal economic ideologies mounted pressure on the monopolistic European electricity 
sector to implement reforms. The third consecutive general election victory for Thatcher 
government in 1987 contributed to the liberalisation and restructuring of state-owned 
electricity utilities in the United Kingdom (Damsgaard, 2003). As an opposite example, in 
Finland, where energy policy formulation and implementation have been dominated by the 
Centre Party and the Social Democrats, the production and import of electricity has been 
highly controlled and regulated by the government (Chang and Bendiev, 2001). 
Therefore, in view of recent scepticisms towards neoliberalism and multilateral bodies, it is 
useful to analyse the political economy of reforms and their outcomes in the SSA region. 
Some argue that, politics in SSA countries are not driven by government ideology, rather by 
institutional factors such as corruption, political instability, and ethnic fractionalisation. For 
example, Mkandawire and Soludo (1999) and van de Walle (2002) argue that failures to 
implement reforms such as ESR, stalemates of reforms - where they have been initiated - or 
to attract private investments will not be explained by government orientations in SSA 
towards capitalism or socialism, self-reliance policies or globalisation. Similar, Erdogdu 
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(2014b) argue that there are no association between ‘left’- or ‘right-wing governments and 
any aspect of ESR among countries that are not members of the OECD. 
Although, these arguments related to the weak governance have received attention, the main 
argument against the reforms in the region can be traced to government ideologies about the 
role of the state in the economy. After gaining independence, many SSA governments 
advocated comprehensive ownership of means of production and concerted efforts were 
made towards centralised economic management. For example, the Nkrumah government in 
Ghana pushed for the nationalisation of gold mines, while in Zambia the government took 
over the copper mines. Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, and Malawi adopted pure Marxism as 
form of government (Stambuli, 2002). The SSA countries confronted with the debt crisis of 
the 1980s, were advised by the World Bank and the IMF to restructure their economies prior 
to the extension of financial support. The Structural Adjustment Programmes required them 
to reduce the role of government in the economy through privatisation and competition. 
There was widespread opposition towards such conditionalities seen as a neoliberal agenda 
(Nwagbara, 2004). Similarly, the vertically-integrated nature of South Africa’s electricity 
sector despite ESR, has been attributed to government focus on social imperatives; lack of 
regulatory and policy certainty; and conflicts in political ideology (Khan et al., 2016). 
Furthermore, some case studies of ESR in SSA countries highlight that ideology is an 
important factor in countries of the region. Gore et al. (2018) find in Uganda, Tanzania, and 
Ghana, citizen expectations for the state to provide electricity were a significant factor that 
constrained ESR implementations. Despite these debates, and their tendency to shape the 
current political landscape as well as implementations of ESR, there is little evidence on how 
government ideology may have influenced the performance of electricity sector reforms 
through regulatory decisions. The above studies do not investigate the ideological differences 
in the impact of IRA on electricity sector performance. While IRAs are expected to increase 
efficiency, generation capacity, and expand access to service in SSA, the expected 
performance improvements of IRAs may be larger in some countries, especially in those with 
truly independent IRAs. While some of the reviewed studies treat IRAs and other institutional 
variables as exogenous (e.g., Estache et al., 2009), we treat these variables as endogenous, 
and use an Instrumental Variables (IV) estimator to investigate the impact of regulation and 
ideology on two indicators of electricity sector performance. 
 
2.1. Hypotheses 
The preceding subsection described how ideological orientations of governments could not 
only influence the creation of IRAs but also their subsequent credibility, independence, and 
performance. We formulate three hypotheses to test whether SSA countries have upheld the 
independence of IRAs or interfered in their functions to advance ideological objectives and 
the implications of this on the generating capacity and access rates. We expect right-wing 
governments to be more inclined towards creating credible, independent, and effective IRAs 
since they favour the protection of property rights, and legal equality as attributes of market 
economies. This is because implementation of electricity reforms entails reducing the reach 
of the government in the sector and introduction of market competition, thus it is more 
compatible with the ideological orientations of right-wing governments that tend to favour 
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smaller size of governments. Although, right-wing ideology is widely associated with the 
freedom of choice and protection of property rights, the successful implementation of the 
reform model in Chile shows that ideology can also thrive under authoritarian regimes even 
though it is difficult for such regimes to make commitments due to time-inconsistency 
problem (McGuire and Olson, 1996). Therefore, SSA countries regarded as dictatorships are 
also capable of implementing reforms like their democratic counterparts. Thus, since building 
large-scale transmission and distribution infrastructures and extending them towards poor 
areas is costly (Ahlborg et al., 2015), we expect the benefits of having access to affordable 
and reliable electricity by low income households to be limited under right-wing governments 
since the ideology tends to be driven by economic motives. This observation brings us to the 
first hypothesis: 
H1: Governments associated with right-wing ideologies would create credible and effective 
IRAs to promote economic regulation thereby increasing the installed generation capacity 
but not the access rates to the service. 
Gilardi (2008) show that due to the pressure to make creditable commitments not to adopt 
interventionist policies post reforms, left-wing governments would create independent 
regulators and liberalise markets. Thus, the creation of IRAs by left-wing governments can be 
seen as a commitment device since they are more likely to pursue policies aimed at protecting 
consumers. In contrast to right-wing governments which aim to pursue economic regulation, 
left-wing governments tend to pursue social regulation. However, extending services to those 
without access will also depend on increasing the capacity of utilities. Therefore, left-wing 
governments will also have incentives to support investments to increase capacity. Although 
left-wing governments have incentive to promote social regulation aimed at protecting 
citizens from the consequences of liberalisation (Ennser-Jedenastik, 2016; Hawkins and 
Hutler, 1993), they may also promote regulation especially when the interventions could 
fulfil their social objectives. This leads to the second hypothesis: 
H2: Left-wing governments may interfere with IRA functions to increase both generation 
capacity and access rates. 
Although, some governments in SSA are observed to be inclined either towards the left or the 
right in the dataset compiled by Cruz et al. (2016), there are other SSA governments that do 
not easily fit into neither of the two wings. In other words, such government policy objectives 
consist of ideologies of the two competing wings, focused on strengthening private enterprise 
in a social-liberal context and hence party platform does not focus exclusively either on 
economic or alternatively on social issues. We categorise these group of countries as having 
centrist governments based on the definitions in Cruz et al. (2016)
5
 on government ideology. 
Thus our final hypothesis is: 
H3: There will be uncertainty on IRA’s credibility, when there are competing wings in the 
government or governments that do not have clear economic or social objectives thus 
performance may improve or deteriorate. 
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 For definitions and categorisations of government ideology, see Cruz et al. (2016). 
11 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Econometric model 
In order to analyse the effects of political ideologies and IRAs on performance, we specify 
and estimate an econometric model. We postulate that electricity sector performance (esp) 
depends on a dummy that indicates whether an independent regulatory agency exists in 
country i at year t, and a vector of control variables (x). In order to capture the ideological 
differences on the performance of IRAs (ira), we include two ideology dummy variables – 
left-wing (left) and right-wing (right) – that are additionally included interacting with ira as 
regressors. The comparison group consists of the countries in the sample we categorised as 
centrist governments. The coefficients of these variables show the effect of ideological 
differences on electricity sector performance. The performance model we estimate is 
presented in (1): 
𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4(𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡𝑖𝑡 · 𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑡) 
+𝛽5(𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖𝑡 · 𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑡) + ∑ 𝛽6𝑞𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑄
𝑞=1
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                              (1) 
where esp is the performance indicator reflecting either of the two performance indicators: 
total installed capacity and access to electricity (i.e., access rates, access). βs are parameters 
to be estimated, αi are country-specific effects and control for time-invariant unobservables 
and 𝜀𝑖𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎
2
), is the stochastic error term. The vector x of control variables includes GDP 
per capita, total electricity generation, the size of electricity markets and corruption. Also, 
included as controls are two dummy variables indicating whether a country has privatised its 
utilities and has opened its electricity sector for private investments, and has unbundled its 
electricity sector.
6
 
3.2. Estimation strategy 
Using the pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimator to estimate the parameters of 
Equation 1 yields inconsistent and unreliable results for two reasons.
 
First, due to the 
presence of endogenous variables such as corruption (corr) and GDP per capita (gdpper), and 
second, the likely correlation between country-specific factors (captured by αi) such as 
history, colonisation, and culture, and other regressors. This issue could be addressed by 
using a Fixed Effects (FE) estimator to ameliorate the bias arising from unobserved 
heterogeneity and endogeneity of regressors. An issue is that most indices and dummy 
variables in the model have little variation over time, which may lead to large standard errors 
of the coefficient estimates if an FE estimator is utilised. The Random Effects (RE) estimator 
is not appropriate either because, as noted, the regressors are likely to be correlated with 
unobserved country-specific factors. 
                                                          
6
This consists of four types of private sector investments in power sector utilities of SSA namely management 
and lease contracts, brownfield, greenfield projects, and divestures. 
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Apart from the sources of endogeneity, reform performance equations tend to be represented 
as dynamic (e.g., Imam et al., 2019; Jamasb et al., 2005; Wintoki et al., 2012). In other words, 
performance depends not only on the current values of the regressors, but also on their past 
values. The OLS, the FE, and the RE estimators cannot produce consistent coefficient 
estimates in the presence of endogenous regressors and dynamics. Instead we use a dynamic 
panel General Method of Moments (GMM) estimator proposed and developed in a series of 
studies (e.g., Holts-Eakin et al., 1988; Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano and Bover, 1995; 
Blundell and Bond, 1998). These studies, particularly Arellano and Bond (1991), proposed 
two estimators, the one-step and the two-step GMM. We use the two-step GMM estimator 
because it provides more efficient estimators over the one-step GMM estimator (Gyimah-
Brempong and de Camacho, 2006). 
The use of a dynamic panel two-step GMM estimator improves on both the OLS and FE 
estimators by allowing for the inclusion of country-specific effects (αi) to account for time-
invariant unobserved heterogeneity, and the current performance to be influenced by previous 
realisation of performance. Similarly, unlike Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) which relies 
on difficult and sometimes unreliable instruments, the Difference GMM (Diff-GMM) 
estimator relies on internal instruments contained within the panel. In other words, past 
values of the regressor and performance can be used as instruments, and this eliminates the 
need for external instruments. However, Diff-GMM estimator like the FE not only eliminates 
αi, but also removes all time-invariant variables through differencing the model during 
estimation. As noted by Roodman (2008), Diff-GMM performs poorly in the presence of 
persistent processes because the lagged levels may convey little information on future 
changes. As a result, the estimator tends to produce inconsistent estimates since the 
differencing produces weak instruments. 
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) improved on the shortcomings of 
the Diff-GMM estimator and developed its variant, the System GMM (Sys-GMM) estimator 
which allows for the inclusion of time-invariant regressors, which would have otherwise 
disappeared in the Diff-GMM estimation. Thus, the estimator solves the problems of 
endogeneity of regressors and dynamics by treating the model as a system of equations in 
first differences and in levels. It does so by instrumenting the endogenous regressors by lags 
of their levels, while instrumenting those in the level equation with lags of their first 
differences. We use these advantages of dynamic panel System GMM estimator to obtain 
consistent estimates. This entails transforming Equation 1 into a dynamic panel specification 
where the lagged values of the two performance indicators (installed capacity and access 
rates) are included as additional regressors in (2): 
𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4(𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡𝑖𝑡 · 𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑡) 
+𝛽5(𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖𝑡 · 𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑡) + ∑ 𝛽6𝑞𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑄
𝑞=1
                                                  (2) 
where 𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡−1 denotes the lagged value of performance, whilst 𝜑 is the parameter associated 
with that variable. All other variables and coefficients are defined as before. Using the 
dynamic System GMM estimator to obtain consistent and unbiased results depends on two 
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specification tests. The first is a Hansen test for overidentification restrictions which is a joint 
test of model specification and appropriateness of the instrument vector. Failure to reject the 
null hypothesis of the test indicates that instruments used in estimation are valid and the 
model is well specified. The second is Arellano and Bond (1991) test for serial correlation of 
the disturbances up to the second order. The appropriate check of the test for serial 
correlation (AR) relates only to the absence of second-order serial correlation, AR(2), since 
the first differencing induces first-order serial correlation, AR(1), in the transformed errors. 
 
3.3. Data 
Dependent variables 
The dependent variables in our model are installed capacity (cap) and access rates (access). 
We measure generation capacity by total installed capacity and access rate by percentage of 
total population with access to electricity. There are several ways to measure both, none of 
which is ideal. We focus on these two indicators of performance, because for SSA 
governments to increase access rates and meet supressed demand, install capacity must grow 
by more than 10% annually (Eberhard et al., 2011). Therefore, we would expect reforms to 
increase generation capacity and access to affordable electricity. Data on annual installed 
capacity (cap) and access (access) were sourced from the United States Energy Information 
Administration (EIA), and the World Bank Development Indicators Database. Additionally, 
electricity consumption per capita (comper) has been used as dependent variable in one 
model presented in the Appendix. Data on total electricity consumption averaged by total 
population was obtained from the United Nations Energy Statistics Database, while the data 
on total population was obtained from the World Development Indicator Database. 
Independent variables 
Information on government ideology is sourced from Beck et al. (2001) database of political 
institutions and updated by Cruz et al. (2016) which classifies governments as either left-
wing, right-wing, centrist, or lacking an ideology. The variable ranges between 0 and 3, 
where the value 1 represents right-wing governments, the value 2 represents centrist 
governments, 3 represents left-wing governments, and countries without ideology were coded 
as 0. We construct three dummy variables in order to reflect the three respective government 
ideologies of SSA governments.
7
 
In addition to the government ideology index, we use the Freedom House measure of 
freedom ratings, which consists of the evaluation of a country’s political rights and civil 
liberties, to check the robustness of our estimates. Freedom rating is the combined average of 
two ratings – political rights and civil liberties ratings. Countries with an average score from 
1 to 2.5 are defined as free, countries with scores from 3 to 5 as partly free and countries with 
scores from 5.5 to 7 as not free. We use this classification to construct three dummy 
                                                          
7
 In the category of centrist governments we also include countries which lack ideology and countries without 
information on government ideology in the database. 
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variables
8
 that reflect the level of political rights and civil liberties in SSA countries. It is 
generally accepted that human freedom or liberty is intimately related or interwoven with 
property rights which are mostly associated with right-wing governments. Conversely, 
countries with left-wing governments tend to implement policies that put property rights at 
risk thereby discourage private investments, innovation and beneficial risk taking. Therefore, 
strong legal protections for property rights are a necessary condition for attracting private 
sector investments to increase both generation capacity and access rates. 
The data on the independent regulatory agencies (ira) is drawn from Eberhard et al. (2016) 
and updated with additional data from Foster et al. (2017), Cape Verde, Seychelles, and São 
Tomé and Príncipe electricity regulatory agencies’ websites as indicated in Table 1. 
Following Jamasb et al. (2004), we create a dummy variable that takes value 1 to indicate the 
existence of an IRA and 0 otherwise. The existence of an IRA has been associated with 
improved electricity sector performance (Cubbin and Stern, 2006), while political institutions 
can influence and improve the performance of IRAs (see Nepal and Jamasb, 2015). 
Control variables 
We include corruption (corr) in the model since the implementation of ESR also entails 
reducing the corruption levels (World Bank, 2000) which are noted to have a significant 
impact on generating capacity of utilities and access (Estache et al., 2009). We use the control 
of corruption index obtained from Kaufmann et al. (2010) which is included in the World 
Bank Governance Indicator Database. The corruption index, which measures corruption in 
both public and private sectors, ranges from -2.5 (highly corrupt) to 2.5 (highly clean). 
Summary statistics of the data used in our estimations are presented in Table 2. The summary 
statistics indicate that total installed capacity, access, and other variables vary greatly across 
the SSA countries in our sample. For example, there is a wide variation in the data on 
installed capacity with cap ranging from a low of 0.01 GW for Liberia in 2005 to a high of 
46.12 GW for South Africa in the same year. Our sample therefore includes countries with 
high level of installed generation capacity as well as countries with very low levels of 
installed capacity. 
In order to represent the demand side, we use two control variables. First, previous studies 
have shown that investments are needed to increase both the generating capacities of utilities 
and increases in access rates are largely dependent on level of economic development 
(Zomers, 2001; Ahborg et al., 2015). Thus, we include a measure of countries’ GDP per 
capita (gdpper). Second, we include the percentage of population that lives in urban areas 
(urban) as a proxy for size of electricity markets. The data on both variables were obtained 
from World Bank Development Indicators Database. 
  
                                                          
8
 The intuition for this is that freer societies are mostly associated with laissez faire policies aimed to reduce the 
role of the state in economic affairs and thereby avoid interfering with individual freedom. Moreover, Erdogdu 
(2013) argues that ESRs have been more extensive in countries with more investment freedom. 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of the Data 
Variables Labels Unit Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min. Max. 
Dependent Variables        
Access Rates access % 720 33.17 23.86 0.01 99.4 
Installed Capacity, Total cap GW 720 1.76 6.49 0.01 47.44 
Elect. Consumption, Total comper GWh 716 356.22 659.32 1.61 4,187 
        
Independent Variables         
Regulator ira Dummy 720 0.57 0.50 0 1 
Centrist governments centre Dummy 696 0.65 0.48 0 1 
Left-wing governments left Dummy 696 0.25 0.43 0 1 
Right-wing governments  right Dummy 696 0.10 0.30 0 1 
        
Partly free governments pfree Dummy 720 0.45 0.50 0 1 
Not free governments nfree Dummy 720 0.33 0.47 0 1 
Free governments free Dummy 720 0.16 0.37 0 1 
        
Control Variables        
Privatisation priv Dummy 720 0.57 0.50 0 1 
Structure struc Dummy 720 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Elect. Generation, Total gen GWh 720 8,439 36,139 21.68 263,479 
Corruption corr Index 675 -0.64 0.59 -1.77 1.22 
Ethnic fractionalisation ethnic Index 720 0.67 0.22 0 0.93 
Conflict conflict Index 720 0.57 1.45 0 7 
Ruggedness rugged Index 720 1.26 1.59 0.15 6.66 
Latitude lat Degrees 720 0.01 14.21 -29.58 20.26 
GDP, Per Capita gdpper 2010 US$/Inhab. 701 2,005 2,954 193.87 20,334 
Population Density popden Inhab./km
2
 716 86.23 118.35 2.31 621.97 
Urbanisation urban % 716 38.63 16.60 8.25 88.12 
Population Growth poprate % 716 2.56 0.84 0.13 5.54 
Note: access, cap, comper, gen, gdpper and popden were log-transformed prior to estimation. 
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On the supply side, we include total electricity generation (gen) and two ESR variables, 
privatisation (priv) and structure of the electricity market (struc). Data on priv was obtained 
from the World Bank Infrastructure Database. Data on gen is sourced from United Nations 
Energy Statistics Database, while data struc of the electricity market is from Foster et al. 
(2017). The database is composed of annual observations for a sample of 45 SSA countries 
for the period 2002-2015.
9
 For robustness checks of our results, we add two each of 
institutional variables (ethnic fractionalisation and conflict), topographical variables 
(ruggedness and latitude) and demographic variables (population density and population 
growth) to both installed capacity and access rates equations. For data sources, descriptions 
of these variables as well as the results of the robustness tests see section 4.3. 
 
4. Results 
This section presents the coefficient estimates of the installed capacity and access equations 
using the dynamic panel Sys-GMM estimator. The first subsection discusses the estimates of 
the installed capacity equation while the second subsection discusses the estimates of access 
equation. We then report three robustness tests of our results. The regression statistics 
presented at bottoms of all results tables indicate that the models fit the data well. Arellano 
and Bond (1991) tests for serial correlation, AR(1) and AR(2), indicate that there is first order 
serial correlation, but not at the second order, which shows the inconsistency of OLS and the 
appropriateness of using a GMM estimator in this analysis (Arellano and Bond, 1991). In 
addition, Hansen’s test of model specification and overidentifying restrictions indicates that 
the models are correctly specified with appropriate instruments. Failure to reject the null 
hypothesis of the test indicates that the instruments used in estimation are valid and the model 
is well specified. 
 
4.1. Total installed generation capacity 
The results of the two-step Sys-GMM estimates of the installed capacity are presented in 
Table 3. The coefficient of ira is positive and significant indicating that, all things being 
equal, the establishment of an IRA is positively correlated with improvements in generation 
capacity. This is in line with results obtained by several other studies (Cubbin and Stern, 
2006; Nakano and Managi, 2008). This is consistent with Eberhard et al. (2016) observation 
that countries that established IRAs (Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and 
Uganda) were able to increase installed capacity by attracting new IPPs compared to 
countries without IRAs. However, this result contrasts with results obtained by some studies 
                                                          
9
 SSA countries in the sample are: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, 
Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Dem. Rep. Congo, Rep. Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial 
Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Countries 
contained in the sample were dictated by data availability especially data on ideology. 
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(Nagayama 2010; Zhang et al., 2008) on the effects of IRAs on installed capacity. Our results 
support the view that IRAs help mitigate or insulate IPPs from investment risks especially 
when investing in weak institutional environments. For example, the Energy Regulatory 
Commission of Kenya helped reduce the power purchase agreement charges radically 
between the first set of IPPs negotiated and the second (Eberhard and Gratwink, 2011). 
The coefficients of both left and right are not significant suggesting that, the effect of the two 
government ideologies on installed capacity are not different from that of centrist 
governments in SSA countries. The coefficient of priv is positive and significant indicating 
that privatisations of hitherto state-owned utilities and other forms of private participations 
have increased generation capacity. This is consistent with Eberhard et al. (2016) observation 
that private utilities post reforms, account for more than 25 percent of SSA countries’ total 
installed generation capacity. Moreover, other empirical studies have also found private 
sector investments in electricity sector are positively correlated with performance 
improvements (Cullmann and von Hirschhausen, 2008; Zhang et al., 2008; Megginson and 
Netter, 2001; Nagayama, 2010). However, our result contrast with other studies that find IPPs 
and other forms of private sector participation have no impact on generation capacity (e.g., 
Bonifaz and Santín, 2000). 
 
Table 3: Two-step GMM Estimates of Total Installed Capacity Equation 
Total Installed Capacity (ln cap) 
Variable Est. t-stat. 
ln cap (t-1) 0.910*** 42.68 
ira 0.261*** 5.41 
left -0.021 -0.32 
right -0.152 -1.11 
priv 0.141*** 2.88 
struc -0.597*** -3.37 
iraXleft -0.195*** -2.61 
iraXright 0.343** 2.27 
corr 0.200 1.24 
ln gdpper 0.111* 1.68 
urban -0.002 -0.72 
intercept -0.764* -1.76 
No of obs.  590 
No of countries  45 
Instruments  42 
AR(1) test (p value)  -2.46 (0.014) 
AR(2) test (p value)  0.88 (0.381) 
Hansen test (p value)  26.80 (0.634) 
Significance code: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The coefficient of struc is negative and significant, indicating that structure of electricity 
sectors especially the unbundling of the hitherto state-owned utilities have negatively affected 
generating capacity of utilities. This may indicate that in the five countries that unbundled 
their electricity markets in SSA, it could be that system operators are grappling with the 
complexities of coordinating generation and transmission post reforms. Our result contrast 
with Nepal and Jamasb (2012b) who find that reform measures such as unbundling did not 
result in efficiency improvements in the sector and Nagayama (2010) who finds that key 
reform measures (i.e. unbundling, IPPs investments, and establishment of IRAs) has led to 
improved efficiency. 
The coefficients of corr and urban are both not significant indicating that, corruption and size 
of electricity markets has no statistical impact on generation capacity. These estimates 
especially on corruption, contrasts with those obtained by Imam et al. (2019), Wren-Lewis 
(2013) and Estache et al. (2009) for technical efficiency. However, this may be explained by 
the choice of installed capacity as dependent variable. This is likely because electricity 
generating utilities, especially IPPs, seeking to mitigate investment risks while operating in 
weak institutional environments such as in SSA countries, often sale their electricity output to 
off-takers or require sovereign and World Bank guarantees thereby effectively insulating 
them from corruption. The coefficient of gdpper is positive and significant indicating that 
income has positive impact on the installed capacity of the sectors. 
Are there government ideological differences in efficiency impact of IRAs? The answer is 
provided by the coefficient estimates of the two interaction terms. The coefficient of iraXleft 
is negative and significant, suggesting that installed capacity impact of IRAs in countries with 
left-wing governments is lower than impacts of IRAs in countries with centrist governments. 
This result is in line with the results obtained by earlier studies that showed the adverse 
effects of left-wing governments on regulation (e.g., Pitlik, 2007; Bjørnskov, 2005) and thus 
regulatory outputs. The coefficient of iraXright is positive and significant, implying that the 
generation capacity effect of IRAs is larger in countries with right-wing governments than 
those with centrist governments. This result is in line with Potrafke (2010), Bortolotti et al. 
(2003), and Bortolotti and Pinotti (2008) who noted that right-wing governments favour the 
independence of IRAs to promote their economic objectives. 
The coefficients of the interaction terms reinforce the arguments of the World Bank (1993) 
and Megginson and Netter (2001) on how interventionist policies such as government 
financed provision of electricity and sheltering of utilities from competition is less efficient 
than services provided by private utilities in competitive electricity markets. This is because 
countries with institutionalised protection of property rights and rule of law
10
 (Acemoglu and 
Robinson, 2012) are mostly countries that attract private investments in the form IPPs and 
can increase generating capacity (Eberhard et al., 2006). In SSA countries with history of 
interventionist policies, aversion to neoliberal reforms or with leaders who can effectively use 
state institutions to reward loyalists or punish foes, less ESR have been implemented (van de 
Walle, 2001) and direct government regulation of the sector exist. 
                                                          
10
 Mostly associated with right-wing governments. 
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The interactions coefficients suggest that we reject Hypothesis 2 and conclude that left-wing 
ideologies by interfering with IRAs’ functions have led to lower generation capacity in SSA 
during the period of our study. And we fail to reject Hypothesis 1, which suggests that right-
wing governments promote IRAs’ independence and thus have increased generation capacity. 
These two coefficient estimates indicate that there are significant differences in terms of 
ideology in generation capacity effects of regulators. We therefore reject the proposition that 
there are no ideological differences in the generation capacity of IRAs. 
 
4.2. Access to electricity 
There are conflicting arguments in the literature on the definition of access rates.
11
 For 
example, Min (2008) use share of population in unlit areas based on analyses of satellite night 
time images, while Ahlborg et al. (2015) and Estache et al. (2009) have used electricity 
consumption per capita and kilograms of oil used per capita as indicators of electricity access 
rates. Notwithstanding the conflicting choice of indicators by these researchers, we have used 
the percentage of total population of a country with access to electricity services as dependent 
variable in the access equation. However, we have also presented the estimation results for 
electricity consumption per capita in the Appendix.
12
 
The coefficient of ira is positive and significant suggesting that, that SSA countries that have 
established IRAs have increased access rates. This result confirms the result obtained by 
Imam et al. (2019) on the positive impacts of SSA countries’ IRAs on access improvements 
and World bank (2017) report that show how Rwanda’s electricity regulator (RURA) by 
overcoming regulatory risks that inhibit electrification efforts, was able to reduce connection 
costs and increased access rates from 6 percent in 2008 to 16 percent in 2012.
13
 Similar 
findings were established by studies on other developing countries. For example, Cubbin and 
Stern (2006), Erdogdu (2014) and Zhang et al. (2008), find regulatory governance as result of 
power sector reforms have not only expand generation capacity expansion, utilisation of 
generation capacity and reserve margin, but also enhanced service penetration. 
The coefficient of right is negative and significant suggesting that access to electricity is 
lower in countries with right-wing governments than countries with centrist governments. 
This result is consistent with the arguments that right-wing governments provide less for 
basic needs (Moon and Dixon, 1985) and prefer minimum government involvement in the 
economy (Chang and Berdiev, 2011). The coefficient of left is not significant indicating that 
access rates effects of left-wing governments are not different from that of countries with 
centrist governments. The coefficient of priv is negative and significant suggesting that 
privatisation of utilities and other forms of private participation have led to reduction in 
access rates. This result is consistent with other findings that how privatisation policies have 
led to access rates reductions (Bhattacharyya, 2006; Sihag et al., 2007) and to concentration 
of services to profitable areas in SSA countries (Victor, 2005). 
                                                          
11
 See Ahlborg et al. (2015), Min (2008), and Doll and Pachauri (2010) on choice of access indicators. 
12
 The results in the Appendix confirm the estimates of the access equation presented in Table 4. 
13
 This was achieved in conjunction with Electricity Sector Wide Approach (eSWAp) policy of Rwanda. 
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Table 4: Two-step GMM Estimates of Access Rates Equation 
Access Rates (ln access) 
Variable Est. t-stat. 
ln access (t-1) 0.727*** 107.11 
ira 0.094*** 3.22 
left 0.004 0.23 
right -0.121*** -2.58 
priv -0.039*** -3.25 
struc -0.020 -0.76 
iraXleft -0.115*** -4.27 
iraXright 0.083 1.62 
corr 0.042 1.23 
ln gdpper 0.090*** 7.00 
ln gen 0.034*** 4.80 
urban 0.004*** 4.30 
intercept -0.067 -0.97 
No of obs.  590 
No of countries  45 
Instruments  43 
AR(1) test (p value)  -2.51 (0.012) 
AR(2) test (p value)  -0.10 (0.920) 
Hansen test (p value)  33.02 (0.322) 
Significance code: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The coefficient of struc is not significant suggesting that unbundling of electricity sectors of 
SSA countries have no effect on access. The coefficients of gdpper, urban and genper are all 
positive and significant indicating that per capita income, the size of electricity markets and 
electricity production have all boosted access to electricity services in SSA countries during 
the period covered by our study. This is because post reforms implementations, increased 
income level, expansion of transmission and distribution networks, and electricity generation 
especially by private utilities have helped expand the electricity supply capacity and thus 
enhanced access to electricity (Jamasb et al., 2016). 
The coefficient of iraXright is not significant, suggesting that the access rates effect of IRAs 
in SSA countries with right-wing governments is not different from that of SSA countries 
with centrist governments. However, the coefficient of the interaction term iraXleft is 
negative and significant. This indicates that, the access rate impact of IRA in SSA countries 
with left-wing governments is lower than those of countries with centrist governments. This 
result suggests that ideologically motivated interventions especially by left-wing 
governments in regulatory functions have constrained the efforts of IRAs to incentivise 
utilities to increase access rates. In fact, a significant number of SSA countries’ electricity 
utilities well-documented failures to extend services to the millions without access has been 
blamed on inappropriate regulation and government intrusiveness, rather than effectiveness 
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of ESR (Kipaki and Eberhard, 2013; Eberhard et al., 2016). These two estimates entail the 
rejection of Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 which postulated that interference in the 
regulatory functions by left-wing governments increases access rates while by right-wing 
governments has access reducing effects. 
Moreover, these estimates contrast with the ideas presented by some theoretical works (e.g., 
Gilardi, 2005; Hawkins and Hunter, 1993) that left-wing governments place more weight on 
social issues (e.g., access to electricity by the poor) and thus interfere in the IRAs functions to 
promote social regulation. Similar arguments were put forward on the effects of right-wing 
governments. For example, right-wings governments associated with promotion of 
competition and preventing dominant firms from abusing market power (Ennser-Jedenastik, 
2016), are also expected to increase social welfare indirectly through these policies. Our 
results did not live up to the expectations of these theories and indicate that there are 
significant differences in access rates effects of political ideologies. 
 
4.3. Robustness test 
It is possible that our obtained results on installed generation capacity and access rates 
impacts of IRAs and ideologies are affected by omitted variable bias or choice of the 
ideology variable. Hence, in this subsection we test the robustness our estimates of the two 
performance indicators. We begin by adding six addition regressors (two each of 
demographic, institutional, and topographical variables), two at a time, to both to the installed 
capacity and access rates equations to see if this would significantly change the coefficient 
estimates of the two interaction terms. We then estimate the two equations by using an 
alternative of measure of ideology (Freedom Index) to see if our results are driven by the 
choice of the institutional index used. 
4.3.1. Additional regressors 
Min (2008) argue that physical geography of a country and countries at higher absolute 
latitude influences investments in electricity infrastructure needed to extend services 
especially to those in rural areas. Excluding these two variables from the performance 
equations could, potentially, lead to biased coefficient estimates of the effects of IRAs and 
government ideologies on installed capacity and access rates. We therefore use ruggedness 
(rugged) and latitude (lat) as additional regressors in the two performance equations. Rugged 
is measured in hundreds of meters of elevation difference for grid points 30 arc-seconds (926 
meters on the equator or any meridian),
14
 while lat is expressed in decimal degrees, for the 
geographical centroid of a country. Data on both variables were obtained from Nunn and 
Puga (2012). 
Other studies have argued that ethnic fractionalisation and civil wars and conflicts are among 
the major challenges facing efforts to increase infrastructure investments and increase access 
                                                          
14
 However, the measure used in this paper is an index which gives more weight to densely populated areas. 
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to electricity services (Min, 2008; Ahlborg et al., 2015). We therefore an include index of 
conflict which is the total summed magnitudes of both societal and interstate conflicts 
(conflict), and a time-invariant ethnic fractionalisation (ethnic) index to the two performance 
equations. These two variables are obtained from Alesina et al. (2003) and Marshall (2017) 
respectively. 
Finally, several studies find population density (popden) and growth rate of population 
(poprate) to have effects on electricity sector performance (Erdogdu, 2012; Imam et al., 2019; 
Eberhard et al., 2016). We therefore add annual population density, which is in people per 
square kilometres of land area and growth rate of total population. Data on popden is from 
the World Bank Development Indicators Database while data on poprate is from the United 
Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2018). 
The results of the robustness test are presented in Tables 5-6. Columns 1, 3, and 5 in both 
tables present the coefficient estimates of iraXleft, iraXright and the rest of the variables 
when the six variables divided into 3 different sets are included as additional regressors in the 
capacity and access equations. Coefficients of the dummy interactions remain significant and 
with the same signs regardless of the additional regressors we included in the two equations. 
The coefficient of ira also remain significant and with the same sign. The estimates suggest 
that the ideology dummy variables are not acting as proxies for some omitted regressors 
which should have been included in the global performance equations. 
 
Table 5: Two-step GMM Estimates of Total Installed Capacity Equation 
Installed generation capacity (ln cap) 
 rugged + latitude ethnic + conflict popden + poprate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variable Est. t-stat. Est. t-stat. Est. t-stat. 
ln cap (t-1) 0.923*** 45.09 0.911*** 43.27 0.644*** 9.68 
ira 0.258*** 6.92 0.415*** 5.62 0.846** 2.08 
left 0.026 0.45 0.056 0.86 0.070 0.25 
right -0.180 -1.49 0.010 0.09 0.075 0.16 
priv 0.096*** 2.91 0.134*** 3.07 0.235* 1.66 
struc -0.378** -2.26 -0.984*** -4.10 -2.765*** -3.26 
iraXleft -0.239*** -3.59 -0.371*** -4.39 -0.625* -1.79 
iraXright 0.192* 1.87 0.415* 1.90 1.581** 2.46 
corr 0.275* 1.67 0.210* 1.95 0.335** 2.39 
ln gdpper 0.125** 2.24 -0.059 -0.62 -0.414* -1.75 
urban -0.003 -1.11 0.002 0.48 0.017 1.61 
rugged -0.028 -1.36 -0.009 -0.52 0.005 0.04 
lat 0.003 1.36 -0.003 -1.11 -0.030* -1.92 
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ethnic   0.329 1.31 2.607* 1.91 
conflict   -0.030** -2.06 0.013 0.58 
ln popden     0.091 1.10 
poprate     -0.153 -1.41 
intercept -0.710* -1.89 0.020 0.03 0.043 0.03 
No of obs.  590  590  590 
No of countries  45  45  45 
Instruments  44  40  39 
AR(1) test (p value)  -2.45 (0.014)  -2.48 (0.013)  -2.37 (0.018) 
AR(2) test (p value)  0.90 (0.366)  0.76 (0.444)  -0.29 (0.771) 
Hansen test (p value)  25.90 (0.680)  23.32 (0.501)  18.02 (0.648) 
Significance code: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 6: Two-step GMM Estimates of Access Rates Equation 
Access rates (ln access) 
 rugged + latitude ethnic + conflict popden + poprate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variable Est. t-stat. Est. t-stat. Est. t-stat. 
ln access (t-1) 0.734*** 83.60 0.705*** 88.13 0.735*** 56.22 
ira 0.116*** 3.01 0.060** 2.18 0.047*** 2.63 
left -0.003 -0.13 0.020 0.84 0.069 1.61 
right -0.119* -1.75 -0.093* -1.84 -0.075* -1.85 
priv -0.040*** -2.93 -0.004 -0.24 -0.020 -0.92 
struc 0.032 1.31 0.026 1.00 0.181** 2.52 
iraXleft -0.109*** -3.11 -0.076*** -2.67 -0.150*** -3.17 
iraXright 0.054 0.92 0.035 0.77 -0.065 -1.42 
corr 0.114*** 2.76 0.034 0.95 0.061 1.39 
ln gdpper 0.072*** 3.56 0.037 1.28 0.035 1.24 
ln gen 0.024*** 2.85 0.053*** 5.78 0.061*** 6.08 
urban 0.005*** 4.09 0.008*** 6.10 0.007*** 3.84 
rugged 0.029*** 2.58 0.012 0.64 -0.008 -0.72 
lat 0.002** 2.11 0.005*** 5.50 0.007*** 6.96 
ethnic   -0.525*** -4.14 -0.480*** -3.12 
conflict   -0.013* -1.84 -0.096*** -4.87 
ln popden     0.010 0.81 
poprate     -0.042*** -2.60 
intercept 0.063 0.57 0.425* 1.94 0.446* 1.84 
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No of obs.  590  590  590 
No of countries  45  45  45 
Instruments  39  41  43 
AR(1) test (p value)  -2.56 (0.010)  -2.53 (0.011)  -2.49 (0.013) 
AR(2) test (p value)  -0.03 (0.975)  -0.02 (0.983)  -0.20 (0.839) 
Hansen test (p value)  21.36 (0.618)  21.37 (0.617)  22.40 (0.555) 
Significance code: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
4.3.2. Alternative measure of ideology 
Our results of the installed capacity and access estimations are based on the ideology index 
compiled by Beck et al. (2012) and updated by Cruz et al. (2018). It is possible that our 
earlier obtained results are driven by this choice of index. To analyse this possibility, we use 
an alternative institutional index – the Freedom House’s freedom rating – to check the 
ideological differences in the performance impact of IRAs. 
The results of the estimations of installed capacity equations and access rates using the 
Freedom House index as our alternative measure of ideology are presented in Table 7. The 
estimated coefficient of IRA is significant and positive in both estimations, thus confirming 
our earlier obtained results. The coefficient of the dummy interactions terms in both columns 
1 and 2 remain significant and with the same signs regardless of the freedom rating used as a 
proxy for the ideology index in both two equations. In other words, these estimates suggest 
that freedom differences in the performance effects of ira we find in this section are similar to 
the ideological differences in the performance impact of ira we found above and thus our 
earlier results are not driven by the ideological index we use. 
 
Table 7: Two-step GMM Estimates of Access and Installed Capacity Equations. 
 
Installed generation 
capacity 
Access rates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Est. t-stat. Est. t-stat. 
ln cap (t-1) 1.020*** 147.61   
ln access (t-1)   0.748*** 161.63 
ira 0.069*** 4.03 0.147** 2.49 
nfree 0.014 0.40 0.219*** 3.96 
free -0.138*** -9.10 -0.134* -1.65 
priv -0.032** -2.39 -0.061*** -2.61 
struc -0.070*** -4.77 0.172*** 6.80 
iraXnfree -0.053** -2.09 -0.167*** -3.08 
iraXfree 0.061*** 4.85 0.029 0.35 
corr -0.024 -1.00 0.268*** 5.18 
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ln gdpper 0.027 1.53 0.061* 1.74 
urban 0.001 0.34 0.005*** 3.70 
ln gen   0.004 0.46 
intercept -0.133 -1.38 0.288 1.47 
No of obs.  613  613 
No of countries  45  45 
Instruments  44  43 
AR(1) test (p value)  -2.33 (0.020)  -2.97 (0.003) 
AR(2) test (p value)  0.95 (0.344)  -0.37 (0.708) 
Hansen test (p value)  31.70 (0.482)  29.80 (0.476) 
Significance code: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
5. Conclusions and policy implications 
The common and important feature of electricity sector reforms in Sub Saharan Africa over 
the past two and half decades, has been the creation of independent regulatory agencies. 
These new institutional bodies were mandated to regulate and oversee the electricity market 
and look after consumer interest. IRAs were expected to depoliticise electricity price-setting 
and encourage private sector investment through transparent and predictable decisions. By 
fulfilling these regulatory tasks, IRAs were to increase the generating capacity and access to 
electricity services. Despite the anticipated performance improvements, there is some 
evidence that the region’s electricity sectors are still bedevilled by low generation capacity, 
poor network infrastructure, and large group without access to services. 
Numerous studies have linked the poor outcomes to factors such as historical, economic, 
financial, and corruption related factors. However, political economy factors have received 
less attention in the literature. For example, some studies have noted that, political ideology 
of governments may promote or constrain regulatory functions. Our paper focuses on the 
influence of political ideology on IRAs and their regulatory effectiveness. We use panel data 
and a dynamic panel data estimator to investigate ideological differences in the effects of 
IRAs on total installed capacity and access rates. 
We find that IRAs have positive and significant effects on both generation capacity and 
access rates. We similarly find significant ideological differences in the effects of IRAs on 
installed capacity and access rates. The largest negative effects of the interactions between 
IRAs and ideology on installed capacity and access rates is found in SSA countries with left-
wing governments. Our results are robust after controlling for additional variables and 
different measure of ideology that have impacts on electricity sector performance. 
What policy implications can be derived from our results? All the SSA countries that have 
implemented ESR aimed to achieve certain level of economic development through 
increasing the productivity of their electricity sectors and access to electricity. Our results 
imply intrusion into regulatory functions especially by left-wing governments would lead 
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reductions in investments need to increase generation capacity and expand access rates since 
regulatory decisions would be viewed by investors as politicised. This means that countries 
with left-wing governments cannot expect large inflows of private sector investments or a 
stable and efficient electricity sector, all necessary conditions for achieving a higher and 
sustained level of economic development. The implication of our results is that countries with 
left-wing governments can increase the growth rate of income by taking steps to reduce 
interferences in IRAs functions because, because this will not only increase generation 
capacity, but would also lead to higher access rates. 
The performance impact of IRAs is not uniform in all SSA countries. Therefore, while it may 
be necessary to strengthen the independence of IRAs in all SSA countries to signal credibility 
and attract the needed private sector investments to increase generation, expand transmission 
and distribution infrastructure and access rates, this may not equally pressing in all countries 
of the region. As noted, the need to reduce interference in regulatory functions to attract 
private sector participation into electricity generation and boost access rates is more pressing 
in countries with left-wing governments and countries with centrist governments than it is in 
countries with right wing governments. 
Therefore, SSA governments with different ideologies should place differential emphasis on 
policies to strengthen the independence of IRAs as a means of improving efficiency and 
access rates. While strengthening the independence of IRAs in left-wing governments may be 
critical for increasing capacity and access rates, it may not be as critical for right-wing or 
centrist governments, especially in increasing capacity. Then giving more independence to 
IRAs or not interfering in their functions in SSA countries by the same proportion will not 
only improve increase capacity and access, it will also help narrow the gap among the 
countries with different ideologies, since SSA countries with low installed capacity and 
access rates will benefit the most by boosting the independence of IRAs. 
These results should be interpreted with caution as the proxies for IRA and government 
ideologies do not reflect the degree, extent, or intensity of regulation nor the dynamics or 
incentives of governments. There is a need for further studies to investigate regime (e.g., 
democracy and autocracy) difference in the effects of reforms to enhance our understanding 
of the link between performance and politics as well as other institutional factors that may 
constrain regulatory functions and private investments. 
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Appendix: A 
Two-Step GMM estimates of consumption per capita equation 
 
Table A1: Two-step GMM Estimates of Consumption per Capita Equation 
Consumption per capita (ln comper) 
Variable Est. t-stat. 
ln comper (t-1) 0.793*** 10.43 
ira 0.086** 2.14 
left 0.045 1.05 
right -0.075 -0.68 
priv 0.017 0.47 
struc -0.419*** -3.58 
iraXleft -0.070* -1.94 
iraXright -0.006 -0.06 
corr 0.038 0.72 
ln gdpper -0.279*** -2.99 
ln gen 0.255*** 4.64 
urban -0.003 -0.66 
intercept -1.602* -1.65 
No of obs.  590 
No of countries  45 
Instruments  37 
AR(1) test (p value)  -1.87 (0.061) 
AR(2) test (p value)  -0.66 (0.512) 
Hansen test (p value)  23.37 (0.498) 
Significance code: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
